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An industry is modeled in which entrepreneurs, who are heterogeneous
in ability, may produce formally or informally. It is shown how the formal-
informal mix depends on the distribution of ability, product demand and
various parameter values. The industry equilibrium is compared to one in
which informality is prohibited. With relatively high product demand, the
eﬀect of entrepreneurs being free to choose informality is that consumer sur-
plus and total employment are reduced, but proﬁt is redistributed towards
more able entrepreneurs. With relatively low product demand the opposite
eﬀects obtain. We also show that informality may be a built-in stabilizer or
destabilizer.
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1 Introduction
The literature on informality in developing economies has to a large extent fo-
cused on its employment aspect. This reﬂects the critical importance of informal
employment, which comprises about 60% of the labour force in these economies.
Though proportionately smaller than informal employment, comprising nearly 40%
of GDP, the output from informal activity also plays a fundamental role, perhaps
meriting more attention from researchers than it has so far received.1 In this paper
we examine how the pattern of informality/formality in an industry is related to
the distribution of entrepreneurial abilities and the strength of the demand for the
industry’s output, as well as to various parameters relating to the relative costs
and beneﬁts aﬀecting the entrepreneur’s choice between formality and informality.
We use this framework to consider welfare aspects of the industry equilibrium, an
issue that seems to have been neglected in the literature.
Our analysis relates only to activities in which formality-versus-informality
is an active choice for an entrepreneur. It is not meant to apply to the lower
tier of informal activity, which has low value added, often only involving resale,
with low capital-intensity and almost no paid employment. Rather, it relates to
informal activity that can make proﬁt, is more capital-intensive, involves paid
employment and may entail competition with formal ﬁrms (see Fields, 2005, on
this distinction). This tier of informal activity can be seen as the equivalent of the
1These ﬁgures, which are widely cited, are taken from Schneider and Enste (2000). A more
recent ﬁgure given by Schneider (2006) is that the ‘shadow economy,’ deﬁned as market-based
legal production, constitutes 38.7% of GDP, on average, for 96 developing economies.
1small-scale entrepreneurial sector in developed economies (Maloney, 2004).
We characterize a formal ﬁr ma so n et h a tp r o v i d e ss o c i a lb e n e ﬁts for workers
(or, equivalently, pays a minimum wage rate that does not apply to informal ﬁrms),
as well as having to pay a fee for ﬁrm registration. Thus, in the terminology of
Bourgignon (2005), formal ﬁrms provide ‘good’ jobs, while informal ﬁrms provide
‘bad’ ones. We assume, however, that a formal ﬁrm obtains a productivity beneﬁt
from greater access to public goods. In practice, formality is also strongly associ-
ated with larger size, which is often treated as its deﬁning characteristic.2 Formal
regulations may only apply to ﬁrms above a speciﬁed size, as in India (see Ahsan
and Pages, 2007), and, more generally, an entrepreneur operating informally may
be inhibited from expanding the ﬁrm by the fear of attracting the attention of
the authorities (Fortin, Marceau and Savard,1997; World Bank, 2007). To capture
this size factor we make the speciﬁc assumption that the ﬁrm operated by any
given entrepreneur would use twice as much capital and labour with formality as
it would with informality. Nonetheless, the amount of labour an entrepreneur em-
ploys per unit of capital is assumed to depend on a parameter reﬂecting his or her
entrepreneurial ability. Given the distribution of the ability parameter across the
population of potential entrepreneurs, we determine the industry equilibrium in
terms of which entrepreneurs enter and what status, formal or informal, is chosen
by each.
We examine how the formal and informal components of output supply depend
2There is no generally agreed way to deﬁne informality, though lack of registration is included
in most deﬁnitions. The two approaches most commonly taken are also to specify that (a) workers
are not covered by social security beneﬁts or (b) the ﬁrm does not exceed some employment size
threshold. For example, deﬁnition (a) has been used by the South African government and (b)
by the Moroccan one (Walther and Filipiak, 2007). Although we use (a) for most of our analysis,
in the penultimate section we consider the eﬀects of instead using (b).
2on the distribution of entrepreneurial ability, the output price and the various pa-
rameters of the model. When deciding whether to enter formally, an entrepreneur
does not internalize either the social beneﬁts his or her ﬁrm provides to workers or
the registration fee that is a transfer to the state. (If they were internalized, for-
mality would always be chosen.) We distinguish four cases, according to whether,
for a formal ﬁrm, the cost of social beneﬁt provision and the cost of registration is
high or low (each measured relative to a critical value). We then focus on a base-
line case - a high social beneﬁtc o s tb u tl o wr e g i s t r a t i o nc o s t-f o rc o m b i n a t i o n so f
parameter values that result in a mix of formality and informality.
We compare the industry equilibrium when each (producing) entrepreneur is
free to choose either formality or informality, with one in which informality is
prohibited. Having informality as an option is found to cause some entrepreneurs
to choose informality who would otherwise have chosen formality, and some to
produce informally who would otherwise not have produced at all. We assume
that for a suﬃciently high output price there is a binding constraint on the supply
of entrepreneurs, either because the pool of entrepreneurs is itself relatively limited
or because there is an aggregate constraint on a complementary factor (we develop
the example of a capital constraint). It is then found that informal output supply
may be non-monotonic in price. At relatively low prices there is only formal
supply; at intermediate prices there is both formal and informal supply; while at
high prices there is only formal supply.
The impact of informality on total output supply can go either way: for a
relatively low range of product demand it causes total output to rise, but for a
relatively high range of product demand it causes total output to fall. A similar
result is holds for the eﬀect on total employment. Moreover, informality can be a
3built-in stabilizer or destabilizer in the face of ﬂuctuating product demand: there
is an intermediate range of demand for which it is a built-in stabilizer, but outside
this range it is a built-in destabilizer.
We also consider the welfare eﬀects of informality being an option for entre-
preneurs. The eﬀect on consumer surplus can be of either sign - negative when
product demand is high, but positive if product demand is low. The eﬀect on the
labour market is that the number of good jobs is reduced, and this is not neces-
sarily counteracted by an increase in the number of bad jobs: total employment
rises if product demand is low, but falls if product demand is high. Aggregate
proﬁtm a yb ea ﬀected in either direction, but if demand is in the higher range
informality causes a redistribution of proﬁtt o w a r d sm o r ee ﬃcient entrepreneurs,
whereas if it is in the lower range the redistribution is away from the more eﬃcient
entrepreneurs, which we suggest may be damaging for investment and growth.3
Thus, with high product demand the eﬀect of informality being a choice option
is to reduce consumer surplus, total employment and the number of good jobs,
b u tt or e d i s t r i b u t ep r o ﬁt towards entrepreneurs who may be able to use it more
eﬀectively for investment. With low product demand the eﬀect of informality being
an option is to raise consumer surplus and employment, but to reduce the number
of good jobs and to redistribute proﬁt away from the more able entrepreneurs.
In the literature analyzing informality, heterogeneity of entrepreneurial ability
was introduced by Rauch (1991), using a variation of the Lucas (1978) model in
which ability is represented by a multiplicative parameter on output. He thus ex-
3Informality may also, in principle, have a dynamic beneﬁt as a possible stepping-stone to
formality; that is it may allow an entrepreneur to test the market and his or her own ability
without incurring sunk costs. Without such a stepping stone the entrepreneur may not enter.
This argument is analyzed by Bennett and Estrin (2007).
4plains why a ‘missing middle’ in the size distribution of ﬁrms obtains. Our formu-
lation shares with Rauch the assumption of a minimum wage rate (or, equivalently,
social beneﬁt provision) only in the formal sector, though we characterize entre-
preneurial ability diﬀerently. However, at the cost of suppressing the endogenous
choice of size for each ﬁrm that Rauch analyzes, we are able to examine in detail
the product market and welfare ramiﬁcations.
Various authors have analysed informality using the Lucas-Rauch formulation
of entrepreneurial ability. These include Fortin, Marceau and Savard (1997), who
generate a gap in the size distribution of ﬁrms as a result of expenditure by infor-
mal ﬁrms on avoiding detection, and Amaral and Quintin (2006), who endogenize
skills by formulating an overlapping-generations model with occupational choice.
Other building blocks of our model are also common in the literature, including
higher wage rates paid by formal than by informal ﬁrms (e.g., Goldberg and Pavc-
nik, 2003; Banerji and Jain, 2007) and the productivity beneﬁt of formality (e.g.,
Amaral and Quintin, 2006; Loayza and Rigolini, 2006). Factors that we do not
include but which are also found in the literature include taxation (de Paula and
Scheinkman, 2006), diﬀerential capital costs (Straub, 2005), bribery (Ihrig and
Moe, 2004) and job matching (Bosch, 2007). One paper that, like ours, focuses
on the product market is that of Banerji and Jain (2007). However, their focus is
diﬀerent, examining the endogenous diﬀerences in the quality of output between
informal and formal ﬁrms.
In Section 2 the model is set up. Section 3 considers the implications of the
model for the formal-informal mix, while Section 4 examines welfare issues. Section
5 discusses the robustness of the analysis to alternative assumptions relating to the
deﬁnition of informality, the relative sizes of parameters, the way social beneﬁts are
5paid for, and the characterization of entrepreneurial ability. Section 6 concludes
and an appendix contains proofs.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a competitive industry, with free entry, producing a homogeneous good.
A pool of entrepreneurs exists for this industry, each of whom may choose to run
a ﬁrm with informal status, or to run a ﬁrm with informal status, or to stay
out of production. Running one ﬁrm requires an entrepreneur’s full attention.
A ﬁrm is a price-taker in the product market and in input markets. To allow
for heterogeneity of entrepreneurial abilities, assume that a cost coeﬃcient λ is
attached to each entrepreneur, where λ>0,a n dt h a tλ varies across the pool of
entrepreneurs. A higher value of λ reﬂects lower entrepreneurial ability (we refer
to an entrepreneur with a given λ as a ‘λ-entrepreneur’).4
If a ﬁrm is informal it employs k units of capital and produces one unit of out-
put. Setting the capital cost at unity, its capital cost is therefore k. In conjunction
with the k units of capital, a λ-entrepreneur employs λ units of labour to produce
the unit of output, thus incurring a wage cost of λw,w h e r ew is the wage rate.
Writing p for the unit price of output, a λ-entrepreneur who chooses informality
earns proﬁt
π
I = p − wλ− k.( 1 )
Instead, any entrepreneur may choose formal status for a ﬁrm. For a λ-
4Thus, in contrast to Lucas (1978) and Rauch (1991), we model diﬀerences in ability through
a costs, rather than a multiplicative parameter on output. Diiferences in entrepreneurual ability
are characterized in cost terms by Jovanovic (1982) and by the literature that his contribution
generated (see Parker, 2004, for a survey).
6entrepreneur, proﬁti st h e n
π
F =2 [ βp− (w + s)λ − k] − c; β>1.( 2 )
This equation reﬂects two costs and two beneﬁts compared to informality. c is
a ﬁxed cost of formality, which we refer to as a registration cost, though it may
also be interpreted as a lump-sum tax. The second cost is that for each unit
of labour employed, in addition to the market wage, a ﬁrm with formal status
must pay the amount s, which, for most of our analysis we refer to as the cost of
providing social beneﬁts; but we can alternatively interpret w+s as a government-
imposed minimum wage for formal ﬁrms. Note that the λ-coeﬃcient applies to an
entrepreneur regardless of whether formal or informal status is adopted.
On the beneﬁt side, it is assumed that, per package of labour and capital inputs,
af o r m a lﬁrm earns βp of revenue, rather than the p earned by a formal ﬁrm. This
may be because formal ﬁrms gain superior access to public goods such as public
infrastructure, contract enforcement and property rights. It may also be the result
of formal ﬁrms being able to sell their output to the government sector, fetching a
higher price there than the market level p. The other beneﬁta s s u m e df o rf o r m a l
status is that it is associated with larger size. An entrepreneur may prefer to keep
an informal ﬁrm small so as to avoid attracting the attention of the authorities.
Given our other assumptions, an entrepreneur who adopts formality would always
prefer larger to smaller size. To be speciﬁc, we assume that an entrepreneur who
adopts formality uses twice as much capital and labour as when he or she adopts
informality.5
5Our assumptions are consistent with evidence of McKenzie and Sakho (2007) for Bolivia.
They ﬁnd that the cost of registering as formal, in the form of then facing a liability for taxes,
7We denote the opportunity cost for a λ-entrepreneur of running a ﬁrm in the
industry we consider by ¯ π, which, for simplicity, is assumed independent of λ.T h i s
is consistent with entrepreneurial ability being speciﬁc to the industry, in which
case, as in Rauch (1991), ¯ π could be the wage an entrepreneur would make as a
member of the labour force.6
Using (1) and (2), in Figure 1 we plot the loci for πI =¯ π, πF =¯ π,a n dπF = πI
in (λ,p)-space. The relative heights and slopes of these loci depend on whether
c T ¯ c and s T ¯ s,w h e r e
¯ c =2 ( β − 1)k +( 2 β − 1)¯ π;( 3 )
¯ s =( β − 1)w.( 4 )
Thus, four cases are depicted in the ﬁgure (for simplicity, we disregard the possi-
bility of equality, i.e., of c =¯ c or s =¯ s) . In each case all three loci cut the p-axis
at positive values of p, while in cases (i), (ii) and (iv) all three loci intersect in the
positive quadrant at λ = λ
∗ and p = p∗,w h e r e
λ
∗ =
2(β − 1)k +( 2 β − 1)¯ π − c
2[s − (β − 1)w]
; p
∗ =
2sk +( 2 s + w)¯ π − cw
2[s − (β − 1)w]
.( 5 )
[Figure 1]
For (λ,p)-combinations above (below) the πF = πI locus, πF >(<) πI.A b o v e
(below) the πI =¯ π locus, πI >(<) ¯ π, and similarly for the πF =¯ π locus. Hence,
may be more than outweighed by the increase in customer base that is associated with the ﬁrm
b e i n ga b l et oi s s u et a xr e c e i p t s .
6Alternatively, we might have assumed that ¯ π is increasing in λ, i.e., that entrepreneurial
ability in the industry we analyze has value in other industries. This would complicate the
analysis (e.g., the loci in Figure 1 would then diminish in slope as λ increases) without having a
substantive eﬀect on the results.
8formality is chosen for (λ,p)-combinations above both the πF = πI and πF =¯ π
loci. Informality is chosen for (λ,p)-combinations below the πF = πI locus but
above the πI =¯ π locus. For (λ,p)-combinations below both the πF =¯ π and
πI =¯ π loci an entrepreneur stays out of the industry. If c> (<)¯ c we refer to c
as ‘large’ (‘small’), and similarly for s.7 In each panel of the ﬁgure the regions in
which formality (informality) is chosen are denoted by F(I), and those in which
the entrepreneur stays out are denoted by 0.
For informality to occur, at least one of the costs of formality, the registration
cost c and the social cost s, must be large. We shall not discuss any further case
(iii), in which each of these costs of formality is small and so no entrepreneurs
choose informality. For most of our analysis shall focus on case (i) in the ﬁgure,
with c small and s large. Since case (ii), with both c and s large, is equivalent
to case (i) for λ>λ
∗, the results for (ii) are a subset of those for (i), and so we
do not consider them separately. Case (iv), however, is associated with informal-
ity occurring under quite diﬀerent conditions to cases (i) and (ii) and so will be
discussed separately (see Section 5).
Evidence on the size of the registration cost c is provided by Djankov et al.
(2002). They ﬁnd, across 85 countries at various levels of development, an average
oﬃcial registration cost of 47% of annual per capita GDP. From (3), in our model
the critical value ¯ c is greater than the opportunity cost ¯ π, possibly substantially
so (depending on the values of β and k). Although our model is static, ¯ π may
be interpreted as a representation of the present value of the alternative earnings
stream; but the registration cost is a one-oﬀ payment. These considerations sug-
7This simpliﬁes the language, but it must be borne in mind that ¯ c and ¯ s are only large or
small relative to the right-hand sides of (3) and (4), respectively.
9gest that the assumption underlying case (i), that c<¯ c, may typically obtain in
practice. However, Djankov et al. also ﬁnd that the oﬃcial registration cost is
much higher in some countries, being above 100% of annual per capital GDP in
9 of their sample, the ﬁgure rising as high as 460% for the Dominican Republic.
This suggests that a group of countries may exist with c>¯ c, that is, for which
case (ii) or (iv) may apply.
From (4), s>(<)¯ s as (w + s)λ/β > (<)wλ, that is, as, for a λ-entrepreneur,
the unit labour cost for formality exceeds that for informality. Thus, in cases (i)
and (ii), formality involves higher unit labour costs, while for cases (iii) and (iv)
the reverse is true. If the productivity beneﬁt β is suﬃciently large, case (iii) or
(iv) will therefore obtain. Consider, however, the conditions that might make unit
labour costs lower for formality than formality. These may relate to formal unit
labour costs being relatively high or informal unit labour costs being relatively
low.
Formal unit labour costs will be relatively high if formal ﬁrms pay rents to
workers. Teal (1996) ﬁnds strong evidence of rent sharing with workers by ﬁrms
in formal manufacturing in Ghana, rents being signiﬁcantly associated with the
presence of unions, with public and (partial or total) foreign ownership, and with
higher proﬁts. He concludes that the 30% diﬀerential between formal and informal
sectors conjectured by Lewis (1954) is a substantial underestimate. It is also sug-
gested by Collier and Gunning (1999) that in some African countries governments
may generate rents for (formal) ﬁrms on the implicit understanding that the ﬁrms
will pay high wage rates to workers. Thus, in our model satisfaction of the condi-
tion that s>¯ s may be linked to β exceeding unity. Informal unit labour costs may
be relatively low if informal ﬁrms provide beneﬁts that cost little but are greatly
10valued by workers. For example, informal ﬁrms may provide greater ﬂexibility of
hours, and family members may be employed without an explicit wage being paid
(see World Bank, 2007, on such behaviour in Latin America). Finally, note that in
their survey of evidence on African manufacturing, Bigsten and Soderbom (2006)
s u m m a r i z ee v i d e n c et h a tw a g e sa r es i g n i ﬁcantly greater in larger ﬁrms and that
this can only partly be attributed to diﬀerences in worker characteristics.8
3T h e I n f o r m a l - F o r m a l M i x
Let λmin and λmax denote the respective lowest and highest values of λ in the
pool of entrepreneurs. If only minimal entrepreneurial skills are required in the
industry there may be many more (potential) entrepreneurs in the pool than would
be needed to satisfy the demand for the product. Given heterogeneity of abilities,
this implies that λmax may be so large that we can treat it as inﬁnite. A binding
ﬁnite upper bound on λ may exist, however, because the entrepreneurial skills that
are needed in the industry are relatively scarce. We focus on this case because, as
we show, a similar eﬀect on the results will obtain even if the entrepreneurial skills
are not scarce, but a complementary input is rationed. We discuss the example of
a binding constraint on the aggregate supply of capital below.
In Figure 1 a horizontal line at any given price p enables us to see the range of
λ-values associated with informality, formality, or staying out of the industry. The
8For simplicity, we do not allow for the costs of capital being diﬀerent for informal than for
formal ﬁrms. Assuming that capital is more expensive for informal ﬁrms because of their lack
of access to formal sources of ﬁnance, so that they use moneylenders, it becomes less likely that
the appropriately amended version of (4) will be satisﬁed. However, informal ﬁrms may get the
capital from family and friends. In Africa the interest rate for such loans is typically at or close
to zero. For example, in Ghana, La Ferrara (2003) ﬁnds a real interest rate of approximately
zero among kin groups.
11conﬁguration of behaviour that obtains depends on the distribution of λ among
the pool of entrepreneurs, and from this we can determine the output supply curve,
which can be broken into informal and formal components. Combining this with
the demand curve we can ﬁnd what combination of informal and formal production
obtains in equilibrium.
We adopt the following notation. πI = πF for
λ(p)=
(2β − 1)p − k − c
w +2 s
≡ ¯ λ(p);( 6 )
πI =¯ π for
λ(p)=




and πF =¯ π for
λ(p)=




We shall also refer the inverse functions of (6)-(8). The p for which, for a given λ,
πI = πF, is written ¯ p(λ);t h ep for which, for a given λ, πI =¯ π, is written pI(λ);
the p for which, for a given λ, πF =¯ π,i sw r i t t e npF(λ).9
We express aggregate supply and demand as per entrepreneur in the pool. The
cumulative density of λ is denoted by G(λ), and the supply of output by informal
and by formal ﬁrms, per entrepreneur, by qI
s(p) and qF
s (p), respectively, where total
supply per entrepreneur is qs(p)=qI
s(p)+qF
s (p). For brevity, we shall henceforth
omit the phrase ‘per entrepreneur.’
To keep the language simple the results will be stated on the assumption that
the λ-distribution is continuous, but they can easily be written more generally.
9These values of p are ¯ p(λ)= 1








12For the following proposition, which characterizes the supply curves for formal,
informal and total supply, we assume that λmin <λ
∗ <λ max, as illustrated in
Figure 1(i).
Proposition 1 Consider case (i) with λ
∗ ∈ [λmin,λ max].T h e nf o rp ∈ [0,p F(λmin))
supply is zero. For p ∈ [pF(λmin),p ∗] supply is only formal and is increasing in
p.F o r p ∈ (p∗, ¯ p(λmax)] supply is a mix of formality and informality and is in-
creasing in p; formal supply is increasing in p for all p ∈ (p∗, ¯ p(λmax)],w h i l e
informal supply increasing in p for p ∈ (p∗,p I(λmax)], but decreasing in p for
p ∈ (pI(λmax), ¯ p(λmax)].F o rp ∈ (¯ p(λmax),∞) supply is all formal and is constant.
The proposition can be explained by considering progressively higher prices in
the context of Figure 1(i). Raising p from zero, formal entry will become proﬁtable
for an entrepreneur for whom λ = λmin at p just above pF(λmin) (where πF =¯ π cuts
λ = λmin). For p ∈ [pF(λmin),p ∗], there will be formal entry by all entrepreneurs
with λ ≤ λ








For p ∈ (p∗, ¯ p(λmax)], formal entry occurs by entrepreneurs with λ ≤ ¯ λ(p),t h a t
is, where p cuts the πI = πF locus. Informal entry occurs by entrepreneurs with
¯ λ(p) <λ≤ min{λ
I(p),λ max}, that is, between where p cuts the πI = πF locus
and where it cuts the πI =¯ π locus, but only up to λ = λmax, after which, since
the entire pool of entrepreneurs has entered, the only eﬀect of further increases in
price is to induce switches from informality to formality. Thus, for the price range
13p ∈ (p∗, ¯ p(λmax)],
q
F




I(p),λ max}] − G[¯ λ(p)].
Total supply rises until price reaches ¯ p(λmax), when all entrepreneurs in the pool
are producing formally.
Thus, above the minimum price that induces entry, low prices are associated
with formal production only; intermediate prices are associated with a mix of
formal and informal production; and high prices are associated with formal pro-
duction only.
Intuitively, Proposition 1 can be explained in terms of the balance, for any λ
and p, of the productivity beneﬁt of formality, the greater labour costs of formality
- especially so for higher λ - and the larger size (and so, potentially, ability to make
proﬁt) of a formal ﬁrm. If price exceeds pF(λmin), but is no greater than p∗,e n t r y
is proﬁtable for an entrepreneur with suﬃciently low λ, that is, suﬃciently low
labour costs. The impact of a low λ is greater for formality, which uses more
labour, than for informality, and is reinforced by the so, also taking into account
the productivity beneﬁt β of formality. Given that c<¯ c, the registration cost c
of formality is not so great as to prevent this outcome.
When price is raised above p∗, both formality and informality are proﬁtable for
a range of λ-values. But, within this range, for entrepreneurs with relatively high λ,
the greater labour costs of formality make it less proﬁtable than informality. Thus,
the entrepreneurs with a relatively high λ choose informality, while those with a
relatively low λ can proﬁtably bear the higher labour requirements of formality.
14As price is raised yet further, entrepreneurs with a higher λ can enter proﬁtably,
but for those near the higher end of this range, informality is more proﬁtable
than formality because the saving in labour costs outweighs the beneﬁts of greater
size and of the productivity beneﬁt β. However, as price rises further, and more
entrepreneurs choose formality, eventually all the pool of entrepreneurs chooses
formality.
To explore the role of informality further, assume that distribution of λ is
uniform, with mean Λ and upper and lower bounds Λ ± δ (Λ >δ>0), where
Λ − δ<λ
∗ < Λ + δ.T h u s ,Λ − δ = λmin and Λ − δ = λmax and the cumulative
density function is G(λ)=( λ − Λ + δ)/2δ for λ ∈ [Λ − δ,Λ + δ].
Proposition 2 Consider case (i) with a uniform distribution of λ, λ ∈ [Λ−δ,Λ+
δ],w h e r eΛ−δ<λ
∗ <λ +δ.F o rp ∈ (p∗, ˆ p) the option of informality has a positive
impact on output, but for p ∈ (ˆ p, ¯ p(λmax)) it has a negative impact on output, where
p =ˆ p solves (2β − 1)G[¯ λ(p)] + 1 = 2βG[λ
F(p)].
This is illustrated in Figure 2, where ¯ qF
s (p), which is shown by the thick line,
denotes what supply would be if informality were somehow ruled out entirely. This
supply curve is upward sloping until p = pF(λmax), where all the pool of entre-
preneurs are operating formally, and supply becomes vertical. Given, however,
that the option of informality is open to entrepreneurs, this option is exercised as





Starting from p = p∗, qF
s (p)+qI
s(p) is an upward-sloping straight line until
p = pI(λmax). I nt h i sp r i c er a n g es o m ee n t r e p r eneurs would choose formality if
15informality were not available, but choose informality when it is available, and the
formal supply curve qF
s (p) is to the left of ¯ qF
s (p). But some entrepreneurs can make
ap r o ﬁtw i t hi n f o r m a l i t yw h oc o u l dn o tm a k eap r o ﬁt from formality and so are
drawn into production. The net result is that the total supply curve qF
s (p)+qI
s(p)
is to the right of ¯ qF
s (p).
For p above pI(λmax),a sp increases there is a steady switch of entrepreneurs
from informality to formality, but no additional entrepreneurs available to produce
informally. Formal supply increases at the same rate as in the lower price range,
but informal supply falls. The net result is that aggregate supply qF
s (p)+qI
s(p)
slopes up more steeply than in the lower price range. This occurs for prices up to
¯ p(λmax), which corresponds to where πF +πI cuts λ = λmax in Figure 1(i). Above
this price, the supply curve is vertical, supply being all formal.
As can be seen from Figure 2, aggregate supply with informality is less than
it is without informality for the price range p ∈ (ˆ p, ¯ p(λmax)). To justify intuitively
why aggregate supply may be smaller when informality is possible, consider what
happens at price p = pF(λmax). In Figure 1(i), this is the price at which πF =¯ π
cuts λ = λmax. I tc a nb es e e nf r o mF i g u r e1 ( i )t h a ta tt h i sp r i c e ,i fi n f o r m a l i t y
were excluded, the entire pool of entrepreneurs would produce formally. When
informality is possible, however, the less eﬃcient in the pool choose informality.
Since all are producing in both these scenarios, but a λ-entrepreneur produces
less with informality than with formality, it follows that output is smaller when
informality is possible.
An implication is that as p rises, φ, the proportion of active ﬁr m st h a ti sf o r m a l ,
falls from unity and then rises back to unity. More precisely, we have the following.
16Corollary 1 Under the conditions speciﬁed in Proposition 2, φ =1for p ∈
[pF(Λ − δ),p ∗]; 0 <φ<1 with dφ/dp < 0 for p ∈ (p∗,p I(Λ + δ)]; 0 <φ<1
with dφ/dp > 0 for p ∈ (pI(Λ + δ), ¯ p(Λ + δ));a n dφ =1for p ∈ [¯ p(Λ + δ),∞).
Combining this characterization of the supply side with a demand curve for
o u t p u t ,w eh a v et h a ti fd e m a n di ss u ﬃciently tight (so that p ≤ p∗)o rs u ﬃciently
loose (so that p ≥ ¯ p(λmax)) all supply will be formal; but for intermediate de-
mand there will be a mix of formality and informality. However, if the assumption
that λ
∗ ∈ [λmin,λ max) does not hold, the non-monotonicity result disappears. If
λmin ≥ λ
∗ then at the lowest price for which positive output occurs, some supply
will be informal; and if price is raised far enough, informality will disappear. Al-
ternatively, if λmax <λ
∗, informality is never chosen. The non-monotonicity result
also disappears if λmax is so large that, given that demand is not indeﬁnitely large,
market equilibrium is always to the left of the vertical portion of the supply curve.
A distinction can be drawn here. If the industry is such that a high level of
entrepreneurial skills is needed, and these skills are in short supply relative to
derived demand for them, then we shall have the case described in Proposition
1. If demand is large enough, market equilibrium will be on the vertical stretch
of the supply curve, and there will be no informality, though if demand is not so
large there may be some informality. Alternatively, if, only minimal entrepreneur-
ial skills are required then λmax may be large, in which case we shall see some
informality even if demand is at a relatively high level.
If Proposition 2 is reconsidered in terms of employment, rather than output,
we obtain the following.
Corollary 2 Under the conditions speciﬁed in Proposition 2, for p ∈ (p∗, ˆ pl) the
17option of informality has a positive impact on employment, but for p ∈ (ˆ pl, ¯ p(λmax))
it has a negative impact on employment, where p =ˆ pl solves [λ
F(p)]2 = {[¯ λ(p)]2 +
(Λ + δ)2}.
For this case Figure 2 can be amended so that employment, rather than output,
is on the horizontal axis, but still with the goods price on the vertical axis. In
place of each upward-sloping straight-line stretch in Figure 2, both formal derived
labour demand and total derived labour demand are composed of curve segments
that are upward-sloping because a higher price induces more entrepreneurs to
produce both formally and in toto. But the curve segments have diminishing slopes
because the entrepreneurs drawn into production are progressively less able, and so
have progressively greater labour requirements. With these amendments, a result
similar to Proposition 2 is obtained, though ˆ pl, the critical value of p, is higher than
ˆ p (but below pF(λmax)). The availability of the option of informality may cause
aggregate employment to fall because entrepreneurs who would otherwise choose
formality, with its higher level of employment, can, for a range of parameter values,
obtain a higher proﬁt from informality.
As we have noted, if there is a binding constraint on the aggregate supply of
an input that is complementary to entrepreneurship, the eﬀe c ti ss i m i l a rt ot h a to f
exhaustion of the supply of entrepreneurs. Suppose, for example, there is a limit
on the aggregate amount of capital available (though no limit on the supply of
entrepreneurs) and that any rationing of capital is eﬃcient in the sense that an
entrepreneur with a lower λ gets priority over one with a higher λ. Assume that as
p is raised the capital constraint binds ﬁrst at price pa,w h e r epa >p ∗, i.e., where,
in the absence of the capital constraint there would be both formal and informal
18production.
As p rises above pa, some entrepreneurs wish to switch from informality to for-
mality and others wish to enter informally. Since in equilibrium those preferring
formality have a lower λ than those preferring informality, the constraint will bind
for those preferring informality. The increased capital requirements of the entre-
preneurs who wish to switch to formality will be satisﬁed, preventing additional
entrepreneurs from entering informally and taking away capital from the least eﬃ-
cient of those who were already producing informally. The supply of formal output
will rise by the same amount as it would in the absence of the capital constraint,
but informal supply will fall. Aggregate supply will rise, but by less than it would
in the absence of the capital constraint.
As p rises further, this process will continue until p = pb is reached, at which all
informal supply disappears, with all the supply of capital being used by ﬁrms with
formal status. For any rises in p above pb the capital constraint prevents more
entrepreneurs from entering production. Thus, for p ≥ pb t h e r ei sn oi n f o r m a l
supply and the aggregate (formal) supply curve is vertical.
4 Comparative Statics
For a uniform distribution of λ,c o n s i d e rt h ee ﬀects of variation of parameter values
for a given value of p. These are given in Table 1, which shows only the eﬀects
on output, but those on the corresponding employment terms are all of the same
sign as those in the table. The parameters are shown in the columns and output
i nt h er o w s . T h ec o l u m nd e n o t e dwI refers to a change in w with w + s held
constant. The ﬁrst three rows show eﬀects on output when p ∈ (p∗,p I(Λ+δ)],a n d
19the second three rows for p ∈ (pI(Λ + δ), ¯ p(Λ + δ)). The former range is referred
to as ‘low p’ and the latter as ‘high p.’
[Table 1]
In both price ranges formal output is increasing in the productivity beneﬁt
parameter β and decreasing in the cost parameters w, s, k and c.I ti su n a ﬀected by
small variations of opportunity cost ¯ π because entrepreneurs who choose formality
earn proﬁts in excess of ¯ π. It increases if there is a rise in the informal wage
cost wI,w h i c h ,a tt h em a r g i no fc h o i c e ,c a u s e sas w i t c ho fe n t r e p r e n e u r sf r o m
informality.
For low p, informal output is decreasing in the cost parameters w, wI and k.
Variation of parameters, s, β and c, which impact directly on proﬁts under formal-
ity, has eﬀects on informal output of the opposite sign to those on formal output.
Because the entrepreneur with the highest λ of those in informal production just
breaks even, a rise in the opportunity cost ¯ π has a negative eﬀect on informal
output.
The eﬀects on informal output for high p are perhaps more interesting. In this
price range all entrepreneurs in the poola r ep r o d u c i n g( o ra l lo ft h es u p p l yo f
complementary factors is exhausted), and, as a result, although formal output is
unconstrained, informal output is a residual. The eﬀects of parameter changes on
informal output are therefore the opposite in sign to those for formal output. Thus,
an increase in any of the formal cost parameters w, s, k or c has a positive eﬀect on
informal output - even though two of these parameters, w and k, are also informal
cost parameters. An increase in w or k has a direct negative eﬀect on formal
output with, at the margin of choice between formality and informality, some
20entrepreneurs switching to informality, which, being smaller scale, is less aﬀected
by the cost increases. Because informality is a residual activity, and informal proﬁt
exceeds ¯ π for all ﬁrms producing, there is no counteracting shift from informality to
inactivity. However, an increase in wI, because it aﬀects only informal production,
causes a marginal switch from informality to formality, reducing informal output.
From (5) we ﬁnd that both λ
∗ and p∗ are increasing in w, k, β,a n d¯ π,a n d
decreasing in s, wI and c. Using this result together with the equations for ¯ p(λ),
pI(λ) and pF(λ),t h ee ﬀects of parameter changes on the loci in Figure 1 can be
determined. Thus, the eﬀect on the behaviour of each entrepreneur, and on the
formal and informal supply curves, can be found, though, for brevity, we exclude
this analysis here. We end our examination of comparative statics by discussing
the impact of informality on the cyclical behaviour of the economy.
Lemma 1 Consider case (i) with a uniform distribution of λ, λ ∈ [Λ − δ,Λ +
δ],w h e r eΛ − δ<λ
∗ <λ + δ. Informality is a built-in stabilizer for p ∈
(pI(λmax),p F(λmax)), but a built-in destabilizer for p ∈ (p∗,p I(λmax)] and p ∈
[pF(λmax), ¯ p(λmax)].
In Figure 2, if the demand curve cuts both qF
s (p) and qF
s (p)+qI
s(p) in the
range p ∈ (pI(λmax),p F(λmax)), a small vertical variation in demand would cause a
smaller change in output in the presence of informality than if it were prohibited.
In this sense informality is a built-in stabilizer. Alternatively, however, suppose
that the intersections with the demand curve occur outside this range, though
above p = p∗ and below p =¯ p(λmax) the existence of informality adds to output
instability. If the analysis is amended to relate to employment, rather than output,
as discussed in Section 3, the hierarchy of slopes shown in Figure 2 for any given
21p is maintained and so the same conclusions apply with respect to employment as
to output.10
5W e l f a r e
To examine the impact of informality on welfare, assume that the demand curve
is downward-sloping and intersects the supply curve ¯ qF(p) (i.e., when informality
is ruled out) at p =¯ pF,w h e r e¯ pF ∈ (p∗, ¯ p(λmax)). Thus, in Figure 2, the demand
curve passes above point Z and below point Y. If the intersection were outside this
range the introduction of the option of informality would have no eﬀect: all pro-
duction would be formal. We shall consider the components of welfare: consumer
surplus, aggregate social beneﬁts and aggregate proﬁt,11 and also note the impact
on the amounts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs.
Consider ﬁrst consumer surplus. In Figure 2, if the demand curve passes be-
tween points Y and X (¯ pF ∈ (˜ p, ¯ p(λmax)), the option of informality causes the
equilibrium total output to fall and price to rise. Hence, consumer surplus falls.
If, however, the demand curve passes between points X and Z (¯ pF ∈ (p∗, ˜ p)), the
option of informality causes equilibrium total output to rise and price to fall, so
that consumer surplus rises.
Turning to total social beneﬁts, the eﬀect of the option of informality is clear-
cut. Any downward-sloping demand curve passing between Z and Y cuts qF(p)
10Some empirical evidence on this issue is provided by Loayza and Rigolini (2006). They
ﬁnd that in the short run, informal employment is counter-cyclical for the majority, but not all,
developing countries.
11Since formal proﬁt is calculated with the registration cost c (a transfer) netted out, c is also a
component of welfare. But since any statements about the impact of the option of informality on
aggregate social beneﬁts also apply, qualitatively, to the impact on aggregate registration costs,
we do not consider the latter separately.
22to the left of where it cuts ¯ qF(p). Therefore, the option of informality causes
aggregate social beneﬁts to fall; that is, it causes a reduction in the number of
good jobs. Since there is informal production, however, bad jobs are created. This
leads to the question: what is the eﬀect on the total number of jobs?
Although Figure 2 has output on its horizontal axis, we have already noted how
it may be transformed by having employment on this axis. Then, corresponding
to the point X, which occurs at p =ˆ p in output-price space, there is a point at
which the total amount employment is the same with and without the option of
informality. This occurs at p =ˆ pl,w h e r eˆ p<ˆ pl <p F(λmax).T h u s ,i f¯ pF < ˆ pl,t h e
option of informality causes the total number of jobs to rise. The number of good
jobs falls, but this is outweighed, numerically, by the number of bad jobs created.
If, however, ¯ pF > ˆ pl, not only does the number of good jobs fall, but the number
of bad jobs created is insuﬃcient to oﬀset this fall.
Because the equilibrium price is generally diﬀe r e n tw i t ha n dw i t h o u tt h eo p -
tion of informality, expressions comparing aggregate proﬁt under each scenario are
intractable. We note, however, that, depending on the speciﬁc demand curve, the
option of informality can change aggregate proﬁt in either direction.12
12As a limiting case, suppose ﬁrst that demand is horizontal. Then for all p>p I(λmax) all
available entrepreneurs produce (or all complementary factors are used up). Since the option
of formality is chosen by some, and this has no eﬀect on the price received by the others, the
availability of this option must have a positive eﬀect on aggregate proﬁt. Alternatively, suppose
p ∈ (p∗,p I(λmax)]. Using (2), (5), (6) and (8), the option of informality for this price range
changes aggregate formal proﬁtb y∆πF = −
R λF(¯ pF)
¯ λ(¯ pF) 2[βp−λ(w+s)−k−c/2]dλ < 0.U s i n g( 1 )
and (7), aggregate informal proﬁtr i s e sf r o mz e r ot o∆πI =
R λI(¯ pF)
¯ λ(¯ pF) (p − λw − k)dλ > 0. Hence,
∆πF + ∆πI =
[(2s+w)¯ π+(p−p∗)z](p−p∗)[s−(β−1)w]
(2s+w)(s+w)w .S i n c ep>p ∗ by assumption, ∆πF + ∆πI > 0
in this case.
If, however, we consider the alternative limiting case of a vertical demand curve, we can show
by numerical examples that ∆πF +∆πI may be negative. If, for example, k = c =¯ π =0 , w =1 ,
s =0 .5, β =1 .1, Λ−δ =0 .1 and p =1 , then the introduction of informality as an option reduces
price to approximately 0.938 and ∆πF + ∆πI ≈− 0.015.
23These conclusions are summarized in our last proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the demand curve is downward sloping and that, in
the absence of informality, price is ¯ pF ∈ (p∗, ¯ p(λmax)). Then the introduction of
the option of informality (a) causes consumer surplus to rise if ¯ pF ∈ (p∗, ˜ p),b u t
to fall if ¯ pF ∈ (˜ p, ¯ p(λmax)); (b) reduces aggregate social beneﬁts; (c) reduces the
number of good jobs and increases the number of bad jobs, with the total number
of jobs rising if ¯ pF < ˆ pl but falling if ¯ pF > ˆ pl;a n d( d )m a ya ﬀect aggregate proﬁt
in either direction.
The impact of informality is to redistribute welfare; but it is also to redistribute
proﬁt. Consider the price ranges of Figure 2 again. If ¯ pF ∈ (p∗, ˜ p),t h e ni n t r o -
duction of the option of informality causes entrepreneurs to produce (informally)
who are less able than those producing (formally) in the absence of informality.
Also, since there is a negative eﬀect on price, the proﬁts of the latter group of
entrepreneurs fall. Hence, the eﬀect of informality is to redistribute proﬁta w a y
from more able entrepreneurs towards less able ones. In a dynamic model this
might be damaging for investment and growth prospects.
If ¯ pF ∈ (˜ p,pF(λmax)), introduction of the option of informality also brings
less able entrepreneurs into production, but since there is a positive eﬀect on
price, there is also a positive eﬀect on the proﬁts of those producing formally
i nt h ea b s e n c eo ft h ei n f o r m a lo p t i o n( t h em o r ea b l ee n t r e p r e n e u r s ) . F i n a l l y ,
if ¯ pF ∈ (pF(λmax), ¯ p(λmax)], there is no eﬀect on the number of entrepreneurs
producing, but the positive eﬀect on price again causes the more able entrepreneurs
to gain higher proﬁts. Thus, it is possible that the existence of the option of
informality can improve investment and growth prospects.
246 Alternative Assumptions
In this section we consider the eﬀects of three changes in assumptions, beginning
with the deﬁnition of informality. It is possible in the model that some entre-
preneurs at the high end of the λ-distribution will operate informally using more
labour than those at the low end who operate formally, though the latter will
nonetheless be using twice as much capital. This occurs if λmax > 2λmin. Suppose,
however that we change our deﬁnition of informality to the condition that employ-
ment is less than a given size threshold λ0. Assuming that λ0 <λ max, our results
must be amended.
In Figure 1(i) a vertical line would then be added at λ = λ0.F o rλ ∈ [λ0,λ max],
informality is not possible, but for {λ,p}-combinations on or above the πF =¯ π
locus formality is chosen; that is, for points between the πF =¯ π and πF = πI loci
formality is now chosen, whereas in our analysis in previous sections informality
was chosen. In Figure 2, the ZW segment of qF
s (p)+qI
s(p) then does not extend as
far as W. At p = pI(λ0) a new segment slopes up parallel to WX: the restriction
on informality caused by the employment condition has reduced the range of λ
for which informality occurs. However, this new segment does not extend as far
as ¯ qF
s (p).A tp = pF(λ0) another, steeper, segment begins, which meets ¯ qF
s (p) at
V: along this segment, as p rises (a) there is a steady switch from informality to
formality, as described previously, but also (b) entrepreneurs with λ ∈ (λ0,λ max)
switch from not producing to producing formally. These changes aﬀect the details
of our previous conclusions, but do not change their general character.
For Figure 1(iv), with c>¯ c and s<¯ s, the latter inequality implies that, for
a given entrepreneur, unit labour costs are less for formality than for informality.
25In this case, as p rises, the ﬁrst entry, by the entrepreneurs with relatively low
λ, is informal. This is because for such entrepreneurs labour usage is small, and
so the unit labour cost (and size) advantage of formality is outweighed, in proﬁt
calculations, by the relatively large cost c of registration (together with the cost of
social beneﬁtp r o v i s i o n ) .A sp is raised further more entrepreneurs enter informally,
but then a value of p i sr e a c h e da b o v ew h i c ht h ee n t r e p r e n e u r sw i t ht h el o w e s tλ
prefer formality to informality. This is because formality is associated with greater
production and so is favoured, relative to informality, by the higher p.W h e np is
raised far enough (through the intersection of all three loci) informality disappears,
with all additional entry being formal. Indeed, if there were no entrepreneurs with
λ less than the level at which the loci intersect, there would be no informality at
any price.
Consider now the implications of s being provided for formal workers by the
government with the government provision being funded by a proﬁts tax on formal
ﬁrms. If the tax were lump sum it could be regarded as already included in the
registration cost c. Suppose, however, the tax is proportional, at rate t.F o r m a l
proﬁts are then given by
π
F =( 1− t)[2(βp− wλ− k) − c].
Assuming that t<1/2, it is found that there is a critical value, ˜ c of c:




If c>˜ c then the slopes and positions of the πI = πF, πF =¯ π and πI =¯ π loci are as
26in case (iv) of Figure 1, with informality occurring for low {λ,p}-combinations, but
not otherwise. If c>˜ c then the solution is as in case (iii) of Figure 1, informality
not occurring for any {λ,p}-combinations.
Finally, we come to the representation of entrepreneurial heterogeneity. Our
analysis is based on the assumption that diﬀerences in entrepreneurial ability are
manifested in terms of diﬀering labour costs. Heterogeneity might instead have
been represented by a multiplicative coeﬃcient on output that diﬀe r sa c r o s se n t r e -
preneurs. Thus, we would have πI = αp−w−k and πF =2 ( αβp−w−s−k)−c,
where α>0 and a higher α denotes a more able entrepreneur. A necessary
condition for informality to be chosen is found to be that
s>(β − 1)(w + k)+[ ( 2 β − 1)¯ π − c]/2.
If this condition is satisﬁed, informality is chosen for α ∈ [(w+k+¯ π)/p,(w+2s+
k +c)/(2β −1)p) and formality is chosen for α ∈ [(w +2s+k +c)/(2β −1)p,∞).
As p is raised informal supply falls, but formal supply increases such that total
supply rises. The analysis is then similar to that for case (ii) in Figure 2, and
therefore is also covered by our analysis of case (i).13
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has developed a framework for analyzing the mix of formality and
informality in an industry with entrepreneurs of heterogeneous ability and has
13Corresponding to Figure 1, a ﬁgure can be drawn in (α,p)-space. The curves (in the positive
quadrant) for πI = πF, πI =¯ π and πF =¯ π are downward-sloping and non-intersecting. For
s>(β − 1)(w + k)+[ ( 2 β − 1)¯ π − c]/2, πI = πF is the highest and πI =¯ π the lowest.
27considered some implications for welfare. It has focused on a particular application
of this framework, with an aggregate constraint on the supply of entrepreneurs,
or on a complementary factor, that binds for suﬃciently high levels of product
demand. At these levels of demand the impacts of informality being available as
an option to entrepreneurs are that output and consumer surplus are reduced and,
although some bad jobs are created, the number of good jobs is reduced by a larger
amount. Nonetheless, the option of informality causes a redistribution of proﬁts
to more able entrepreneurs, which may be beneﬁcial in the long run.
At lower levels of demand (though still enough to generate both formality
and informality in equilibrium), the opposite eﬀects obtain. The existence of
the option of informality for entrepreneurs results in higher output and consumer
surplus, and the number of bad jobs created outweighs the number of good jobs
lost; but it also causes a redistribution of proﬁts to less able entrepreneurs. These
conclusions would also hold if there were no binding constraints on the supply
of entrepreneurs or complementary factors, though for many industries in poorer
countries the scenario with constraints may be the relevant one.
We also ﬁnd that informality can be a built-in stabilizer or destabilizer, de-
pending on the level of demand, but the ranges for which each of these conclusions
apply do not match those for which informality raises or lowers supply. It is only in
an intermediate range of demand that it is a built-in stabilizer. Outside this range,
provided there is some informality in equilibrium, it acts as a built-in destabilizer.
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For p ∈ (p∗,p F(λmax)], ¯ qF
s (p)=2 βG[λ
F(p)], so that, using (8), ¯ qF0
s (p)=β(2β−
1)/δ(w+2s).F o rp ∈ (p∗, ¯ p(λmax)], qF
s (p)=2 βG[¯ λ(p)],s ot h a t ,u s i n g( 6 ) ,qF0
s (p)=
β
2/δ(w + s). Using (4), it follows that ¯ qF0
s (p) >q F0
s (p). Since output is on the
horizontal axis in Figure 2, ¯ qF
s (p) has the lesser slope.
For p ∈ (p∗,p I(λmax)], qI
s(p)=G[λ














/2δ ≡ x/2δ.T h e n
dx/dp = {2s[s − (β − 1)w]+sw + w2 +2 w2β(β − 1)}/(2s + w)(s + w)w,w h i c h ,
given (4), is positive. However, substituting p = p∗ into qF
s (p)+qI
s(p) − ¯ qF
s (p)=
x/2δ and using (3) and (4), we ﬁnd that qF
s (p∗)+qI
s(p∗) − ¯ qF
s (p∗) > 0. Hence,
qF
s (p)+qI
s(p) − ¯ qF
s (p) > 0 for p ≥ p∗.
For p ∈ (pI(λmax), ¯ p(λmax)], qI
s(p)=1 −G[¯ λ(p)]. Using (6), d[qF
s (p)+qI
s(p)]dp =
(2β−1)2/2δ(w+s). Using (4), d[qF
s (p)+qI
s(p)]dp < ¯ qF0
s (p). The proposition follows.
Corollary 2
For p ∈ (p∗,p I(λmax)],w eh a v ef r o mP r o p o s i t i o n2t h a tqF
s (p)+qI
s(p) > ¯ qF
s (p).
Since labour productivity is higher with formality than informality, it follows that
employment with informality, lF
s (p)+lI
s(p), is greater than employment without,
¯ lF






Λ−δ 2λdλ + 1
2Λ
R Λ+δ
¯ λ(p) 2λdλ. Using (6), this is increasing in
p. However, for the upper part of this p-range, p ∈ [pF(λmax)), ¯ p(λmax)], ¯ lF
s (p)
is constant. Since lF
s (p)+lI
s(p)=¯ lF
s (p) at p =¯ p(λmax),w eh a v et h a tf o rp ∈
[pF(λmax)), ¯ p(λmax)), lF
s (p)+lI
s(p) < ¯ lF
s (p). The proposition follows, with the value




33Table 1 Comparative Statics
βkc¯ πwsw I
qF
s + −−0 −−+
low p qI





s + −−0 −−+
high p qI
s − ++0 +++
qF
s + qI
s + −−0 −−−
34F I π π =
F π π =








0               0
λ*  λ λmax  λmin   
 
    Figure 1(i) c small; s large F I π π =
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Figure 1(ii) c large; s large F I ππ =
F π π =







0               0
λ λmax  λmin   
 
    Figure 1(iii) c small; s small F I π π =
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